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The Klan on Trial
The Great South Carolina Ku Klux Klan Trials, 1871-1872. By Lou Falkner
Williams.* Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1996. Pp. xiii, 197. $35.00.
Led by James Goodman's Stories of Scottsboro,' a number of recent
studies have sought to situate legal practice in a complex and fragmented
cultural context by telling the stories of particular legal proceedings. The
attractiveness of trial histories to cultural and legal historians is readily
apparent. A trial episode is a narrow story that can be described in all of its
depth and complexity, giving due weight to the meaning of legal practice for
multiple constituencies. But if the risk of local histories is a parochialism that
loses sight of how the particular is embedded in broader networks of power,
the trial history can provide a narrative that links local histories to a broader
public sphere in which issues of power and meaning are actively negotiated.
By fusing these two elements-local complexity and what historian Thomas
Bender has called "public culture"3--trial histories at their best can weave
intensive microstudies into nuanced conceptions of a whole.
Lou Falkner Williams's The Great South Carolina Ku Klux Klan Trials,
1871-1872 is a trial history that seeks to forge these kinds of links between
the particular and the general. In this case, the particular is a series of
prosecutions of Klansmen in South Carolina under newly minted federal civil
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rights legislation; the general is the moment of constitutional flux during the
years immediately following the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Concentrating on the roles of the lawyers for both sides and the bench,
Professor Williams argues that the South Carolina trials represented "in
microcosm the reasons why constitutional doctrines and a rule of law sufficient
to protect the former slaves in all the rights of citizenship did not emerge"
from the debate over the relationships among nation, state, and citizen during
Reconstruction (p. 146). The trials, she claims, pitted an intransigent white
South against a white North that was hampered, first, by traditional theories
of dual federalism, and, second, by growing pressure for sectional
reconciliation. Ultimatel,, "ongoing dependence on federal muscle" proved to
be "no substitute for the consent of the governed" (p. 126). Williams's
argument is plausible-even convincing. But it seems to present only part of
the story. Focusing her account almost exclusively on the legal professionals
in the case, Professor Williams glosses over the critical roles of a wide variety
of actors in the trials; in the process, she misses much of the complexity that
characterizes the best trial histories.
The story of the South Carolina Klan trials is familiar terrain to historians
of Reconstruction.4 Following the white Union Reform Party's defeat in the
state elections of 1870, the Klan initiated a reign of terror in the upper
Piedmont that continued through the fall of 1871 (pp. 28-29). Under authority
of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, 5 President Ulysses S. Grant suspended
habeas corpus on October 17, 1871 in nine upcountry counties; mass arrests
followed.6 Beginning in November, federal prosecutors brought indictments
against Klan members under the Klan Act and the Enforcement Act of 1870,7
which sought to protect black political and civil rights from both public and
private violation.
There is something of a scholarly consensus that the apex of Klan violence
in the Reconstruction South was reached in South Carolina's upcountry,8 and
Williams's first two chapters describe the charged political context from which
the violence emerged. Williams argues that when the Union Reform platform
was defeated, "white South Carolinians, in their frustration, mounted a
campaign of violence designed to restore familiar social standards and
4. Other accounts of Klan activity in South Carolina in 1870 and 1871, and of the trials that followed,
include ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 425-59 (1988); ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 88-91 (1985); ALLEN W. TRELEASE, WHITE TERROR 349-80, 401-08 (1971);
JOEL WILLIAMSON, AFTER SLAVERY 261-66 (1965); and Kermit L. Hall, Political Power and
Constitutional Legitimacy: The South Carolina Ku Klux Klan Trials, 1871-1872, 33 EMORY L.J. 921
(1984).
5. Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 4, 17 Stat. 13, 14-15.
6. See FONER, supra note 4, at 457-58. In an unfortunate oversight, Williams inexplicably provides
three different dates for the suspension of habeas corpus in the space of less than 20 pages: April 1871 (p.
29), the correct date of October 1871 (p. 39), and November 1871 (p. 46).
7. Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140.
8. See FONER, supra note 4, at 431; TRELEASE, supra note 4, at 349, 362-63.
1612 [Vol. 106: 1611
Book Note
constitutional liberty" as they understood it (p. 16). In Williams's view, Klan
violence was about the reimposition of traditional "values" rather than mere
"politics" (p. 29). The critical value at stake, she argues, was "the white male's
traditional power" (p. 34). White male South Carolinians shared a "deeply held
racism" (p. 53) and a gendered myth of Southern honor that coalesced in the
explosion of Klan violence of 1870 and 1871.
Williams may underestimate the extent to which the culture of the upper
Piedmont in the Reconstruction years was a culture in flux, in which the
structure of labor relations was radically unsettled and in which racial power
was being reinscribed alongside gender and class hierarchies.9 Williams views
violence against black women, for example, as "almost incidental" to the
Klan's goal of terrorizing the armed black male who threatened the Southern
system of honor (p. 35). There is no doubt some tragic truth to the argument
that women served as mere placeholders in a power struggle between white
and black men, but it cannot explain all of the gendered violence Williams
recounts. She describes an episode in which a freedman asked the Klan to beat
his wife after she had left him for "keeping" another woman (p. 63). The fact
that the Klan complied indicates the extent to which racial and gender
subordination were interwoven in Klan violence. The attack on the home of
William Champion, a white Republican, is another example that challenges
Williams's thesis about the role of black women. Champion was whipped and
then forced "to kiss the posterior and 'private parts' of a black woman and the
posterior of her [black] husband" (p. 30). Klan members then demanded that
he rape the woman, and when he was unable or unwilling to do so, they
ordered him to whip the man (p. 30). What is striking about the Champion
incident is how the ritualized enforcement of white solidarity was enacted
through sexual violence; seen in this light, violence against black women may
be more central to the construction of white male authority than Williams
allows.'
After the first two chapters, Professor Williams leaves behind cultural
interpretation to focus almost exclusively on legal professionals: federal
prosecutors and investigators, federal judges, and defense counsel. The legal
professionals fought over the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
constitutionality of the Enforcement Acts passed in 1870" and 1871.'2 The
prosecution, Williams argues, had two central goals. First, it sought to stretch
9. Foner, for example, emphasizes the ways in which Klan racial "iolcncc scrcd the economic
function of enforcing labor discipline. See FONER. supra note 4. at 428-29. For an account that sets Klan
violence within a context of class as well as racial struggle, see JLLIE SAViLLE. THE WORK OF
RECONSTRUCTION 127, 129, 139 (1994).
10. See also Jacquelyn Dowd Hall. "'The Mind Thar Burns in Each Bod "" Women. Rape. and Racial
Violence, in POWERS OF DESIRE 328, 332 (Ann Snitow et al. eds., 1983) (arguing against intcrprctations
of interracial rape that see it as mere "transaction between white and black men")
11. Enforcement Act, ch. 114.
12. Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22. § 4. 17 Stat. 13. 14-15.
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the state action concept to reach state nonaction. Second, it sought to
incorporate the Second and Fourth Amendments against the states (p. 60). If
these two legal principles could be won, the Attorney General's office could
effectively prosecute Klan members under the Enforcement Acts for violating
blacks' rights to bear arms and to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures.
The prosecution lost on both the question of incorporation and the issue
of state action. As Williams recounts with considerable facility, David T.
Corbin, the United States Attorney for South Carolina, prepared indictments
charging Klan members with conspiring to interfere with black voting,
conspiring to deprive blacks of equal protection of the laws and equal
privileges and immunities, conspiring to deny blacks' Fourth Amendment
rights to security from unreasonable search and seizure and Second
Amendment rights to bear arms, and state law crimes such as burglary and
assault in conjunction with federal civil rights violations (pp. 62-66). Only the
voting charge survived the defense's motions to quash. The bench held that
Congress had always possessed the authority to protect voters in federal
elections as "a power necessary to the existence of Congress" (p. 73), but it
also ruled that "Congress [had] framed the Reconstruction Amendments in a
narrow, negative fashion so as to disturb traditional federal-state relationships
as little as possible" (p. 73). The trial court's ruling thus "effectively curbed
all the broader aims of the government attorneys before the first Klansman was
ever tried" (p. 71). As Williams points out, the effect of the ruling was to
extend federal protection only to males qualifying for the suffrage; violence
against women and children was placed beyond the reach of the federal
government.
Although the prosecution effort continued through the winter and spring
of 1871-72, the constitutional wrangling at the center of Williams's story was
largely over. The prosecution, she argues, had achieved "no substantial
constitutional gains" (p. 111). It had, however, managed to establish federal
authority over voting; in one respect, at least, the South Carolina Klan would
have to "yield to the rule of law" (p. 84). The November 1871 term witnessed
four trials with five defendants, all of whom were convicted, and forty-nine
guilty pleas. There were eighteen convictions after trials in the April term and
eighteen more guilty pleas. The vast majority of those charged, however, had
yet to be processed: At the end of 1872, an astounding 1200 cases were still
pending in South Carolina (p. 123). The federal court in South Carolina was
simply overwhelmed. Thus, despite the prosecution's conviction rate, the trials
ended in the early summer of 1872, as Williams quotes, "'not with a bang but
a whimper' (p. 111)." In the spring of 1873, Attorney General George H.
Williams decided to discontinue all trials; in the summer of that year, Grant
13. Quoting T.S. ELIOT, The Hollow Men, in COLLECTED POEMS 1909-1962, at 79, 82 (1963).
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pardoned all those who had been convicted and granted clemency to those not
yet tried (p. 125). "Southern intransigence," Williams writes, had "refused to
yield to the forces of the national government" (p. 113).
The turn to writing trial histories, of which The Great South Carolina Ku
Klux Klan Trials is an example, is part of a broader shift in the historical
profession to the "micronarrative." Some of the most prominent American
historians are now telling the stories of particular episodes in American history
that cast light on otherwise hidden social tensions and anxieties."4 The fear
that has been voiced by historians about these kinds of microhistories,
however, is that while they contribute enormously to our understanding of
particular collections of people at particular moments, they may leave us with
a series of abstracted, unconnected stories that cannot link the particular to the
general. The trial narrative has the potential to resolve the problem of
parochialism in local narrative. To be sure, a potential for distortion necessarily
accompanies attempts to extrapolate broad conclusions from narrow premises,
and the trial history cannot entirely avoid this danger. Yet the trial narrative
has a double capacity to describe history's particularities while mediating
between the particular and the general because it tells a local story at a cultural
space in which the central concern is the negotiation of political power broadly
construed.
When the trial narrative is configured solely as struggle between legal
professionals, however, this sense of broad contest over public culture is
obscured. Professor Williams's book is undermined by precisely this
narrowness of scope. Her description of the Klan trials submerges what the
wide array of actors playing key roles in the trials thought about the
proceedings. The choices made by blacks who served on juries and as
witnesses to invest themselves in the new constitutional regime, for example,
form an extraordinarily important part of the story of the Klan trials. Yet these
people barely appear in Williams's account. Other constituencies also demand
more sustained attention. What, for instance, is one to make of the confessions
of the white "pukers" who gave evidence against fellow Klansmen in
apparently large numbers (p. 47)? How can these episodes of mass confession
be reconciled with Williams's story of committed white Southern
intransigence?
In short, Williams's premise that only a select few were sophisticated
enough to think about constitutional ideas glosses over the extent to which the
Klan trials provided a forum in which a diverse array of constituencies
14. Perhaps the most telling sign of the strength of the attractiveness of the micronarrative is that some
of the historians most closely associated with the "new social history" of the 1970s now write episodic
narrative histories. Compare, e.g.. JOHN DEMOS. A LITTLE COMMONWEALTH (1970). and PAUL JOHNSON.
A SHOPKEEPER'S MILLENNIUM (1978). and SEAN WILE.'Tz. CHANTS DEMoctRAnc (1984). with JOHN
DEMOS, THE UNREDEEMED CAPTIVE (1994), and PAUL E. JOHNSON & SEAN WILE.¢NTZ. THE KINGDOM OF
MATTHIAS (1994).
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contested the meaning of the American federal system. If the trials provided
some blacks the opportunity to invest themselves in American constitutionalism
by testifying or serving as jurors, not all victims of Klan violence made that
choice. Elias Hill, for example, a crippled black schoolteacher and preacher
who was whipped in a particularly brutal Klan attack, responded to Klan
violence by leading the emigration of a group of 136 blacks to Liberia in
October 1871.5 Given the dramatic rejection of American constitutionalism
by people like Hill, what does it mean that many blacks made different
decisions? When we add to the picture the accused Klan members who fled
to Canada during the federal intervention (p. 47), what begins to emerge is a
picture of the trials as a battle over the meaning of American constitutionalism
that resonated throughout the community, a battle in which citizens made
choices about whether to exercise voice or exit, and in which a wide array of
citizens, black and white, made critical constitutional commitments.
The Great South Carolina Ku Klux Klan Trials succeeds nicely in
describing the trials insofar as they posed challenges to federal prosecutors,
defense counsel, and the courts. One can only wish that Professor Williams
had expanded her field of vision to encompass a wider conception of
constitutional struggle. In this wider lens lies the promise of the trial narrative
as legal history.
-John F Witt
15. See FONER, supra note 4, at 431; TRELEASE, supra note 4, at 371-72. For an account of black
emigration from South Carolina during Reconstruction, see WILLIAMSON, supra note 4, at 108-1I.
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